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ABSTRACT: 
Private sector R&D is largely concentrated in a few multinational companies (MNCs). The mobility of 
labor between these MNCs and the rest of the economy is therefore an important mechanism for the 
diffusion of knowledge and technology, but these flows are not without friction. This paper analyses in 
great detail the flow of labor between firms with specific emphasis on flows to and from R&D intensive 
MNCs. Using linked employer-employee data for Denmark, we match employees moving from R&D 
intensive MNCs to other employees switching jobs. We find that employees are more inclined to move 
between R&D intensive MNCs and their subsidiaries rather than between these firms and other firms in 
the economy. This is particularly true for high skill employees. Our results suggest that other domestic 
firms are to a larger extent kept out of the ‘knowledge spillover’ loop, which provide them with fewer 
opportunities to learn from the R&D intensive MNCs. In other words, R&D intensive MNCs and their 
subsidiaries form a kind of sub-labor market within the national labor market; employees exhibit higher 
mobility within this group of firms than between this group and the rest of the labor market. 
 
JEL CODES: J21, F23, O32 
KEYWORDS: Labor mobility, Multinational companies, Knowledge flows, R&D 
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1. Introduction 
Private sector R&D is concentrated in a few multinational companies (MNCs). In 2015, the top 2500 
R&D firms worldwide invested more than 90 percent of the global business enterprise expenditure in 
R&D (Guevara et al. 2015).  Top R&D investors thus play an important role in the creation of knowledge 
and technology in the economy. The integration of these firms in the broader economy is therefore 
important in order to create knowledge spillovers to the rest of the economy, through various 
mechanisms such as flows of employees from one firm to another.  
Previous literature has investigated the role of labor flows as a mechanism for knowledge transfer from 
MNCs to non-MNC firms in the same country. For example, using data on Norwegian manufacturing 
firms for the period 1990-2000, Balsvik (2011) investigates the productivity spillovers that arise when 
employees leave MNCs to work at non-MNCs. Relatedly, Poole (2013) presents evidence of positive 
spillovers from MNCs to non-MNCs, which is associated with worker mobility, in the context of Brazil. 
Falck (2016) contains an exploratory analysis of labor mobility patterns in Sweden, framed in terms of 
evidence of opportunities for spillovers from MNCs to domestic non-MNCs.  
Related, Stoyanov and Zubanov (2014) analyze Danish employer-employee data to investigate the 
productivity spillovers that arise when employees are hired from technologically-superior firms, and in 
particular they focus on the distribution (between the firm and the focal employee) of the financial gains 
that are generated by these spillovers. Kaiser et al. (2015) demonstrate that firms who hire workers from 
patent-active firms increase their own patent activity. Recently, Csáfordi et al. (2018) finds that labor 
mobility increases productivity whenever workers move from high-productivity firms to low-
productivity firms.  
Labor mobility is a key mechanism in interfirm knowledge transfer (Song et al. 2003; Lenzi 2010; Rahko 
2017). When labor moves from one firm to another it transfers formal knowledge as well as tacit skills 
(Almeida and Kogut 1999). Therefore, hiring can be used by firms to gain access to new knowledge and 
new skills (Palomeras and Melero 2010). Similarly, studies of labor mobility from MNCs closing down 
have shown that the former MNC employees constitute a desirable pool of knowledge and are in high 
demand among local firms (Sofka et al. 2014). Interfirm knowledge transfers are not only created 
directly by the mobility of labor, but also by the informal networks between firms created by labor 
mobility (Lengyel and Eriksson 2017).  
It is thus important that labor flows from R&D intensive MNCs to the rest of the economy, for the 
diffusion of new knowledge and the creation of networks among firms. But for labor mobility to act as 
a mechanism for knowledge transfer, two conditions need to be fulfilled. First, people need to move 
from the R&D intensive MNCs to other domestic firms. Second, knowledge has to be integrated into 
the receiving firm. The literature on absorptive capacity and learning by hiring has addressed the 
question of knowledge integration in great detail. The extent to which labor mobility transfers 
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knowledge is a function of how proximate the two organizations are in terms of knowledge distance 
(Palomeras and Melero 2010), and the receiving firm’s absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). 
These works assume that mobility has occurred, but there are several factors that constrain the mobility 
of workers between organizations. The specific human capital places one constraint but the fact that 
R&D intensive MNC are among the most attractive employers including paying high wages (Hijzen and 
Swaim 2008) is an additional constraining factor that makes it less attractive for workers to move to 
domestic (non-R&D intensive) firms.  
In this paper, we analyse the antecedents of labor mobility with a specific emphasis on labor mobility 
between MNCs and the rest of the economy, and on the consequences of moving between firms on 
employees’ wages. To do this, we construct a unique dataset by merging two datasets. The first dataset 
is taken from the European Commission’s EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard, which contains 
economic and financial data for the top corporate investors worldwide as well as data on the corporate 
structure of the firms allowing us to identify subsidiaries. The other dataset is constructed from registry 
data for the entire Danish economy containing detailed data on all firms, workplaces, employment 
relations and employees for all years from 1980 until 2014. Each individual can be tracked over time 
allowing us to analyse the antecedents of labor mobility.  
Our results suggest that, to some degree, there is segmentation in the labor market. Labor flows from 
R&D intensive MNCs to the rest of the economy are relatively limited. Employees at R&D intensive 
MNCs are less likely to take subsequent jobs at firms that are not R&D intensive MNCs and are more 
likely to take subsequent jobs at R&D intensive MNCs. The probability of employees moving from 
domestic MNCs to other domestic MNCs is particularly high. Moreover, we also observe that jobs at 
R&D intensive MNCs offer a 5 percent wage premium. This could partly explain why labor mobility is 
mainly taking place among MNCs. 
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, we focus on the labor flows of the top 
R&D investors. Our focus on R&D intensive MNCs is an interesting addition, because previous work 
has suggested that the labor mobility of high-skill workers (presumably more common in top R&D 
investors) is associated with especially high spillovers (Poole 2013; Agarwal et al. 2016). Our focus on 
R&D intensive MNCs can be expected to be particularly relevant for policy-makers, whose interest in 
promoting R&D investments is linked to the understanding of the behaviour of R&D intensive firms. 
Second, earlier studies have suggested that there is a need to consider organizational types and 
ownership structure when studying worker mobility (Wright et al. 2016). Thus instead of focusing only 
on MNCs vs non-MNCs (e.g. Balsvik 2011), we also distinguish between foreign and domestic MNCs, 
where domestic MNCs are distinguished from other domestic firms. We therefore identify three 
categories of firms: i) foreign MNCs, having the headquarter located outside Denmark; ii) domestic 
MNCs, headquartered in Denmark, and; iii) other domestic firms. This is important because it allows us 
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to investigate whether domestic MNCs act as a bridge in the labor market between foreign MNCs and 
the other domestic firms. Third, we complement previous studies with evidence on the effects on wages, 
where previous work has generally focused on productivity. Wages are an important component of labor 
market transitions (Campbell et al. 2012; Agarwal et al. 2016; Haltiwanger et al. 2018b), and we are 
able to overcome data limitations that faced previous work in the area to present new results. Fourth, 
while previous literature investigating spillovers from MNCs to non-MNCs has focused on other 
countries, we provide new evidence from Denmark. This is a small, open and well-developed economy 
with a reasonably egalitarian wage structure, and where one could expect a limited role for multinational 
enterprises in shaping the within-country inequalities discussed by Narula and van der Straaten, (2019). 
This paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we discuss previous research and derive our research 
questions. In section 3 we describe the sources of data, while the data are described in section 4. Section 
5 contains the analyses and results, which are followed by a robustness analysis in section 6. The 
conclusions are presented in section 7. 
2. MNCs and Knowledge Transfer through Labor Mobility 
Knowledge transfer from MNCs can happen through more or less formalized channels (Crespo and 
Fontoura 2007; Falck 2016; Di Ubaldo et al. 2018). The location of MNCs in a region can generate 
demonstration effects, as domestic firms imitate MNCs. Knowledge spillovers may arise if domestic 
firms can benefit from operating in the same markets, ecosystems, and supply chains of MNCs. For 
example, the demand arising from MNCs could provide domestic firms with opportunities to invest in 
upgrading in order to provide high-quality inputs for next-generation products. Domestic firms could 
also benefit from proximity to MNCs by buying their products and services and benefiting from the 
knowledge embodied in these. However, these spillover mechanisms may not be effective if MNCs are 
secretive in their business processes, and if MNCs are vertically integrated, or if MNCs source from 
abroad.  
A more formalized channel for knowledge transfer is labor mobility (Almeida and Kogut 1999; Song et 
al. 2003; Audretsch and Keilbach 2005; Görg and Strobl 2005; Lenzi 2010). Individuals who work at 
R&D intensive MNCs may accumulate valuable tacit knowledge, enhance their professional skills and 
practice efficient routines, such that they may be able to take this valuable knowledge with them if they 
start new jobs in other firms. In this way, best-practice is diffused and hiring firms enjoy productivity 
effects (Balsvik 2011; Csáfori et al. 2018).  
MNC employees constitute a desirable pool of knowledge and are in high demand among local firms 
(Sofka et al. 2014). Interfirm knowledge transfers are not only created directly by the mobility of labor, 
but also by the informal networks between firms created by labor mobility (Lengyel and Eriksson 2017). 
In studies on labor mobility of R&D workers in Denmark, Kaiser et al (2015; 2018) find that mobility 
of R&D workers between firms increases the total firm level inventions if one of the two firms involved 
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in the transfer was patent active in the past and have an internal research culture. Big R&D 
multinationals are companies with a proven internal research culture, given they are highly involved in 
scientific publication activities (Camerani et al 2018), which makes them an appropriate environment 
for newly-hired R&D workers to thrive. Furthermore, MNCs with relatively large R&D investments are 
also highly patenting firms (Dernis et al 2019). 
Labor mobility is thus generally seen as positive for the receiving firm, and while it may have adverse 
effects for the source firm, there is a general consensus that the aggregate effect is positive so that policy 
should favor labor mobility (Campbell et al. 2012;Agarwal et al. 2016). Many studies consider mobility 
across companies as frictionless and focus on the potential spillovers deriving from labor mobility 
thereby neglecting the constraints on labor mobility. So, if these firms form a separate labor market in 
the host economy, this limits the effectiveness of the knowledge transfer mechanism via labor mobility 
and the creation of networks among firms. 
The literature on labor flow networks address these frictions explicitly (Guerrero and Axtell 2013; 
Haltiwanger et al. 2018a; Sorkin 2018). In the labor flow networks model, employers are hierarchically 
ranked by employees according to the desirability of the jobs they offer. Higher ranked employers offer 
jobs with a better combination of pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards. Employees do not move 
randomly between jobs, but rather try to find a job at a higher-ranked employer. Jobs at high-ranking 
firms are more competitive, entailing a selection effect whereby the most skilled employees work at top 
tier firms. Firms are thus heterogeneous and employees seek to ‘move up the job ladder’ to better jobs 
(Haltiwanger et al. 2018a). Analysis of moves from employer to employer can reveal the preferences of 
employees for different firms (Guerrero and Axtell 2013; Sorkin 2018).  
Labor mobility plays a role in productivity enhancing re-allocation of workers (Haltiwanger et al. 
2018a), which also explains that a substantial amount of wage dispersion exists between firms (Davis 
and Haltiwanger 1991); at least to the extent at which the high productivity dispersion matches that of 
wages. Previous works (e.g. Oi and Idson 1999) show that firm size contributes in explaining wage 
dispersion; larger firms, where the management can afford paying higher (and more heterogeneous) 
wages, are able to provide wage-premiums. This would influence the choices of employees when 
searching for a new job. Indeed, since an important share of lifetime wage growth is associated to firm-
specific experience and interfirm mobility (Mincer and Jovanovic 1981), holding everything else equal, 
workers will try to move to companies able to pay a higher premium. An emerging stream of literature 
investigates wage growth as individuals move from one category of employer to another (e.g. 
Haltiwanger et al. 2018b), or the pecuniary and non-pecuniary (intrinsic) factors motivating and 
hampering mobility (Agarwal et al. 2016), although to our knowledge there is no such evidence for labor 
flows into and out of R&D investing multinationals.  
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Sorkin (2018, p.1343) finds that about 20% of the variation in earnings is due to a firm-specific effect, 
suggesting that some firms pay higher wages, in general, than others. R&D intensive MNCs can 
therefore be expected to pay wage premiums to their employees to guarantee to be able to attract (at 
least part of) the most talented workers. Their higher capital to worker ratio, advanced technological 
capabilities, exposure to MNC rules, routines, and corporate culture, as well as the accumulation of tacit 
knowledge in a challenging working environment may eventually enhance their workers’ capacities, 
and compensate for the cases where an employee is less productive (or skilled) than expected.  
Overall, we assume that MNCs represent top ranked employers. Therefore, we postulate that, all else 
equal, workers prefer to be employed at an R&D intensive MNC. The “headquarter effect” will enhance 
this for domestic MNCs, due to allocation of decision-making rights (Ciabuschi et al. 2010) as well as 
non-pecuniary benefits of being employed at a national champion. Consequently, we assume that 
domestic MNCs are ranked higher than foreign MNCs. Therefore, the prediction from the labor flow 
networks theory is that individuals working at these firms are highly skilled. Many workers will be 
happy with their jobs and will not move. For those that do move, they will try to stay within the elite 
club of firms. 
The discussion above, opens up for the following research question: What factors hinder and promote 
labor mobility between R&D intensive MNCs and other firms in the economy? To address this question, 
we will investigate whether the domestic and foreign R&D intensive MNCs draw on different labor 
markets compared to other domestic firms, and whether workers in the different labor markets are 
rewarded differently.  
3. Data 
In addressing this overall research question, we investigate labor mobility patterns in Denmark, and we 
take as a point of departure the whole of private sector employees in Denmark in 2012-2014. This 
information is retrieved from the Danish linked employer-employee database (IDA), which provides us 
with detailed information on all individuals and firms in the Danish economy. IDA data are available 
from 1980 onwards, but we restrict the analysis to the period 2012-2014 as data for the corporate 
structure of R&D intensive multinationals are available from 2012, and the final year of IDA was 2014 
at the time of conducting the analysis. IDA’s universal and longitudinal character allows us to identify 
the career trajectory for all workers in the Danish economy, which includes change of employers. To 
measure job mobility, we identify the employment relation in the following calendar year. In our sample, 
we exclude all individuals who move out of employment, i.e. become unemployed, emigrate, start an 
education, or otherwise exit the labor market. 
To assure that mobility events are not driven by firm exit, we exclude mobility events following the 
closure of a firm. Based on this criterion, we have a total sample of just above 4.4 million workers, 
averaging around 1.47 million workers for each of the three years considered. This sample decreases 
8 
 
further as we set additional employment restrictions for the individual workers. First, workers are 
required to have a full-time contract in both years. Second, we only include workers who have been 
employed for at least one year. Third, in case a worker changes job, s/he must have been employed at 
the new employer for at least 90 days. These restrictions lower the sample to 2.5 million observations.1  
To identify R&D intensive MNCs, we rely on the “EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard.” Given 
the data restrictions (i.e. 2012 onwards, as mentioned above) for the corporate structure data, to which 
we merge the ‘Scoreboard data’, we focus on the years 2012-2015. The ‘Scoreboard’ dataset is built 
from the annual reports and provides a ranking of the world’s top 2500 corporate R&D investors.2 For 
each year, we identify Danish MNCs that are present in the Scoreboard, Danish subsidiaries of these 
MNCs, and subsidiaries in Denmark of foreign MNCs.3 Collectively, these three groups are referred to 
as Scoreboard (SB) firms. When necessary we distinguish between the three groups. Firms in the rest of 
the private sectors are referred to as non-SB firms. Based on this information, we identify 1191 unique 
SB firms (204 Danish SB firms and their subsidiaries, and 1021 foreign SB firm subsidiaries).4 Using 
the unique firm identifiers, SB firms and Danish subsidiaries are matched with the employment register 
to identify their employees. 
The registry data contain data on employees and firms, while it is the Scoreboard data that allow us to 
group some firms into conglomerates. The structure of the data is illustrated in Figure 1. This entails 
that only conglomerates where the parent company is in the Scoreboard are identified, and firms referred 
to as non-Scoreboard firms may very well be part of a conglomerate which is not included in the 
Scoreboard data. Any potential conglomerates that are not listed on the Scoreboard would correspond 
to cases of conglomerates with relatively low R&D investments. 
---- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE 
---- 
4. Scoreboard Firms’ R&D Spending and Innovation Performance 
Firms appearing in the EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard account for a significant share of 
economic activity in Denmark measured by employment, innovation activity, and R&D expenditures. 
Therefore, these could be important sources of knowledge transfer. However, there are also notable 
                                                          
1 In our analysis, we also run regression analysis on the unrestricted sample and on a sample only including R&D 
workers, where R&D workers are defined according to Kaiser et al. (2018), i.e. individuals that have a college 
degree in Science, Technology, Mathematics and Medicine (STEMM) and have an occupation with ISCO level 2 
or 3. The findings are robust and details are available upon request. 
2 The full scoreboard is freely accessible at the webpage of the JRC-B3-IRITEC: http://iri.jrc.ec.europa.eu/home  
3 Information on subsidiaries is obtained directly from Bureau van Dijk using the corporate structure of SB firms 
in the period 2012-2015. Overall, Scoreboard firms are linked to about 600,000 subsidiaries. 
4 The two numbers do not add up to 1225 as some subsidiaries change parent company from Danish SB to Foreign 
SB. 
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differences between the domestic firms listed on the Scoreboard and the subsidiaries of foreign SB firms, 
where the domestic SB firms are the largest and most innovative. The subsidiaries of foreign SB firms 
are still larger and more innovative compared to non-SB firms.  
Table 1 shows the innovation activities of subsidiaries of SB firms compared to non-SB firms in 
Denmark. The table is created by merging our data with the 2013 Community Innovation Survey for 
Denmark. 
SB subsidiaries are more innovative than other firms, but domestic subsidiaries are more innovative than 
foreign ones. A potential reason might be the overrepresentation of wholesale activities among foreign 
subsidiaries. Among the domestic subsidiaries, 61% have introduced a product and/or service 
innovation, while the same holds true for 39% of the foreign SB subsidiaries and for 24% of other private 
firms (non-SB firms). Differences among the three groups in the other types of innovation are smaller, 
but the ranking is the same: domestic SB firms and their subsidiaries are the most innovative while non-
SB firms are the least innovative. The reason why the difference is stronger when looking at product 
innovation may be related to the type of activities that the various firms undertake in Denmark. 
---- 
INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
---- 
Table 1 shows that the average non-SB firm invests 0.388 million euros in R&D, while foreign and 
domestic subsidiaries invest 2.3 and 36 million euros, respectively. While SB subsidiaries account for 
12% of total employment, they account for almost 2/3 of private sector R&D in Denmark. The lion’s 
share of these expenditures is represented by subsidiaries of domestic SB firms. Among non-SB firms, 
less than a quarter have R&D expenditures at all (the 75th percentile is zero) while less than half of 
foreign SB subsidiaries have R&D expenditures (the median is zero). Thus, domestic SB firms and their 
subsidiaries do not just spend more on R&D on average; they are also more likely to spend anything at 
all on R&D. The domestic SB firms and their subsidiaries also have the highest R&D intensity, with 
27.9 million euros of R&D per 1000 FTE employment or 9.3 euros of R&D per million euros of sales. 
By aggregating the R&D expenditures of the subsidiaries and comparing the result to the total 
international R&D expenditures of the SB firm as reported in the SB data, it is possible to calculate the 
share of total R&D located in Denmark. The R&D expenditures by foreign SB subsidiaries amounts to 
0.5% of the total international SB firm R&D expenditures for foreign SB firms, while the corresponding 
value for domestic SB subsidiaries is 66%. This highlights that domestic subsidiaries include parent 
firms and that MNCs often have most of their R&D expenditures in their home country. However, it 
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must be kept in mind that foreign subsidiaries still spend much more than other private sector firms on 
R&D in Denmark.5 
5. Analysis and Results 
 
5.1 Variables 
5.1.1 Dependent variables 
The job mobility part of our analysis addresses two elements of our research question. First, we want to 
investigate mobility patterns of employees who work for SB firms compared to workers employed in 
non-SB firms. As mentioned earlier, we identify a mobility event when a worker changes employer. 
Second, besides identifying mobility, we distinguish between mobility to SB firms (which we 
disaggregate into Danish vs foreign SB firms), or to non-SB firms. The dependent variable is a 
categorical variable with three categories: i) the worker remains at the same employer; ii) the worker 
switches employer and the new employer is not a SB firm; iii) the worker switches employer and the 
new employer is a SB firm. The first category is the reference category. In the final model, the dependent 
variable has four categories as we distinguish between new jobs at foreign and domestic SB firms. 
In addition to job mobility, we investigate wage growth following the job change. Wage levels are 
derived by identifying annual salaries obtained from a particular employer and the number of hours 
worked. This allows us to identify hourly wages, which is easily comparable across workers. The 
dependent variable “Wage growth” is measured as differences in the logarithm of hourly wage between 
t and t+1. 
The analysis of wage growth employs an OLS model, while the analyses of mobility employ 
multinomial logistic models (Hilbe 2009). For the latter we construct a dependent variable that is 
exhaustive in terms of forms of mobility within Denmark. We are not able to track labor mobility 
crossing national borders, and we assume that the choice of migrating (or not) can be modelled 
independently from that of choosing different working environments within national borders. This 
assumption is the equivalent of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption, but the IIA 
assumption is also tested with a Hausmann test. The multinomial logistic model produces conditional 
probabilities of the general form specified in equation 1. 
 Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑗|𝑥𝑖𝑡) =
exp⁡(𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽𝑗)
∑ exp⁡(𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽𝑗)
𝑘
𝑗=1
⁡⁡ (1) 
                                                          
5 The differences between the foreign SB subsidiaries and domestic SB firms and their subsidiaries cannot be 
attributed to the latter group including the 25 Danish SB firms themselves, as a large share of the SB firms appear 
very small in the registry data and are not covered by the FUI survey, cf. earlier. Instead, it indicates a corporate 
structure among SB firms where activities in the home country are separated into a number of distinct and legally 
independent firms, e.g. a large domestic SB firm may have a separate R&D subsidiary and not just a R&D 
department. 
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𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable which, for model 1, indicates whether worker 𝑖 in year 𝑡 either: 1) remains 
at the same employer; 2) finds a new job at an SB firm or; 3) finds a new job elsewhere. These three 
alternatives are indexed by 𝑗 and 𝑘 is the total number of alternatives. 𝑥𝑖𝑡 are the independent variables 
elaborated in the next section including a 1 for the intercept, and the  𝛽𝑗 are the vectors of parameters to 
estimate. As 𝑗 = 1  is the reference, 𝛽1 = 0  and we report the estimates for the two vectors 𝛽2 and 𝛽3. 
Later multinomial logistic models will have more levels for the outcome variable, but they all follow 
the general structure of equation 1.  
5.1.2 Independent variables 
Employed at a Scoreboard firm. Based on the Scoreboard dataset, we create a dummy variable indicating 
whether a worker is employed at a SB firm, both considering mother companies and subsidiaries. Here 
we also make a distinction between Danish and foreign SB firms. 
Gender and age. For all workers we have information on gender and create a dummy variable indicating 
if the worker is female. We have also information on the year of birth, which allows us to calculate the 
age of all workers in our sample. 
Tenure and job experience. Tenure is a continuous variable that indicates the number of years a person 
has been employed at the (previous) employer. Job experience is a continuous variable that measures 
the total years that have passed since the first time we observe the person in the employment register. 
Because the register starts in 1980, we have no information on employment history prior this data. 
Wage and skill levels. For wage level, we use the above-mentioned hourly wage rate for the work. As 
an indicator for skill level, we use the ISCO first-digit occupational categories (see Table 2). All workers 
are subsequently divided in three skill set categories: high, middling and low. We create a dummy 
variable for each worker corresponding to the respective skill category. 
Region and industry. For regions, we identify the municipality in which a worker is employed. This 
municipality information is aggregated to the NUTS3 level; Denmark is separated in 12 NUTS3 level 
regions. We also control for industry by creating dummies for the two-digit NACE rev.2 industry codes. 
---- 
INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE 
---- 
5.2 Descriptive statistics 
Figure 2 shows the median wage for the eight occupational groups sub-divided into domestic SB, foreign 
SB and non-SB private sector firms. The median wage is lowest in non-SB firms for most occupation 
categories. The group with the highest median wage is managers of domestic SB firms, which is likely 
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to reflect a “home bias” and subsequent headquarter dominance in the upper echelon of the 
organization’s workforce.  
---- 
INSERT FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE 
---- 
In Table 3, we present the descriptive statistics for the sample. Approximately 3 percent of all workers 
change job (move) in our sample, where about 2.7 percent move to a non-SB firm and 0.3 percent move 
to a SB firm. As mentioned before, 18 percent are employed at an SB firms, and this is divided roughly 
equally between Danish SB firms (and their subsidiaries) and foreign SB firms (through their 
subsidiaries). Since we concluded that the number of Danish SB and their subsidiaries are roughly 20 
percent of all SB firms, we can conclude that Danish SB firms and their subsidiaries are much larger. 
The average growth in hourly wage equals roughly 3 percent. Approximately 31 percent of workers in 
our sample are female, and the average age is nearly 43 years. Average education is 14 years, which 
correspond to an upper secondary education or a short-cycle tertiary degree, and the average work 
experience is approximately 24 years. Workers earn on average 213 DKK per hour (28.5 EURO) and 
40 percent are in an occupation category that is classified as high. 
---- 
INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE 
---- 
In Table 4, we present the mobility patterns of workers in more detail. These patterns show that SB 
workers are less inclined to move compared to non-SB workers. However, when they move, they are 
more likely to move to other SB firms rather than to move to non-SB firms. This already foreshadows 
some of our results that the labor market for SB-workers is rather limited. 
Table 4 shows that there are 230,971 employees in domestic SB firms; 98.7% of these do not move to 
another firm. Only 2606 of these will move to a non-SB firm, 276 will move to a foreign SB firm, and 
124 will move to a different domestic SB firm. Regarding foreign SB firms, 97.5% of employees will 
remain within the firm. Among those that move, 790 will move to a different foreign SB firm, 652 will 
move to a domestic SB firm, and 4022 will move to a non-SB firm. Hence, while most SB employees 
do not change jobs, and many will move to jobs in other SB firms, nevertheless there is a non-negligible 
group of SB employees moving to non-SB firms.  
---- 
INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE 
---- 
13 
 
Table 5 presents the distribution of the different occupation and education levels. Based on the 
distribution of occupation codes, it can be observed that domestic subsidiaries employ a larger share of 
professionals and associated professionals, while foreign SB subsidiaries recruit a relative high share of 
clerical support workers. As for the differences in innovation activities (see Table 1), the differences in 
the distribution of occupations in Table 5 might reflect the difference in economic activities between 
domestic and foreign SB subsidiaries. In particular, it may reflect that a relatively large share of foreign 
SB subsidiaries is wholesalers. SB subsidiaries tend to hire more highly educated workers on average, 
but domestic SB subsidiaries clearly hire more educated workers than foreign SB subsidiaries. 
---- 
INSERT TABLE 5 AROUND HERE 
---- 
5.3 Econometric estimation and results: job mobility 
5.3.1 Multinomial Logit estimations 
To investigate the probability of labor mobility for these workers in greater detail, we apply a 
multinomial logit model.6 These models are presented in Table 6. The results from Model 1 demonstrate 
that, when controlling for other factors, a worker in a SB firm or subsidiary is more likely to stay in a 
SB firm or subsidiary compared to moving to a non-SB firm. However, this worker is more likely to 
move to another SB firm or subsidiary when the opportunity arises. This provides evidence that labor 
markets function more like labor flow networks rather than labor market pools (Guerrero and Axtell 
2013). Employees do not change jobs at random, but employees working at high-status firms (such as 
SB firms) are more likely to move from one SB firm to another. Furthermore, we also see some clear 
distinction in the human capital characteristics for those workers that are inclined to move to a SB firm 
or subsidiary. First, higher educated workers, those with more overall work-experience and high skilled 
occupations are more inclined to move to SB firms or subsidiaries. Less tenure in the previous workplace 
and age is negatively related to a move to a SB firm or subsidiary. Thus based on these results, SB firms 
and subsidiaries draw on workers that appear to be in different segments of the labor market.  
---- 
INSERT TABLE 6 AROUND HERE 
---- 
                                                          
6 To test whether we violate the IIA assumption, we apply a Hausman test especially designed for multinomial 
logistic analysis with clustered data (Weesie, 1999). The Hausman test indicates that the IIA assumption is not 
violated, which means our specification is correct.       
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5.3.2 Coarsened Exact Matching 
Since workers of SB firms are expected to be different from workers for non-SB firms, we have some 
concerns about the comparability of these workers. Consequently, we apply a matching technique to 
address this problem. More specifically, we use Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) (Iacus et al. 2012). 
The CEM approach allows us to balance covariates between workers that are employed in SB firms or 
subsidiaries with workers in non-SB firms, neutralizing possible distortions deriving from different 
distributions of the covariates. Workers are placed in a finite set of bins based on individual-level 
characteristics. Based on this method, we create a new sample where SB employees that cannot be 
matched with non-SB employees (and vice versa) are removed from the sample. The variables used for 
matching are gender, age categories, education levels, and wage quartile. To deal with industry and 
regional variation, we also add our industry and region dummies to the matching equation. 
Based on this procedure, we find a match for 94 percent of the SB employees and 70 percent of the non-
SB workers, occupying a total of 74,241 strata. Implementing CEM reduces the final sample from 
2,530,720 to 1,937,075 workers. In Table 2, we have included a column with descriptive statistics 
between these samples, and the descriptive statistics are rather similar (with the exception of the 
distribution between SB and non-SB workers). Running the multinomial analysis on this matched 
sample (Model 2) yields similar results. 
In Model 3, the SB firms and subsidiaries are divided into domestic and foreign firms, to investigate 
whether there are differences in the mobility patterns of workers. This analysis shows that both forms 
of SB employees are more inclined to remain in the firm rather than to move to a non-SB firm, and that 
the likelihood to move is mainly explained by those employed by foreign SB subsidiary. In Model 4, 
we create an extra category in the dependent variable to measure the relation between the probability to 
move to a domestic or foreign SB firm or subsidiary. The findings demonstrate that employees in 
domestic SB firms and subsidiaries are more likely to move to a domestic SB firm or subsidiary, while 
employees in foreign SB subsidiaries are more likely to move to SB firms and subsidiaries in general, 
particular to other foreign SB subsidiaries. Thus, overall it shows that mobility is rather cliquish, 
meaning that SB employees limit their mobility pattern to within the population of SB firms and 
subsidiaries. In the appendix, we included an additional logit and multinomial logit, where moving to a 
non-SB firm is the benchmark. These models demonstrate that workers in SB firms are between 2 and 
5 times more likely to move to another SB firm rather than moving to a non-SB firm.
5.3.3 Robustness analysis 
We identify SB firms and their Danish subsidiaries. We have thus to acknowledge that the mobility we 
observe might take place between subsidiaries from the same parent company. This might particular be 
an issue since we observe much mobility between subsidiaries from Danish SB firms, while the 
Scoreboard only lists a limited number of Danish MNC’s.  
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While mobility between subsidiaries of the same SB firm would still indicate a relatively closed labor 
market, one might argue that this is the main driver of the positive effect we observe in Table 6. 
Consequently, we run an additional analysis where we remove all mobility that is between the 
subsidiaries from the same parent firm. We would like to emphasize that we can only identify such 
mobility patterns among SB firms, as we cannot identify parent firms of non-SB firms.  
Table 7, both Model 5 and Model 6, demonstrates that some of the positive effect is indeed explained 
by the fact that workers in subsidiaries of SB firms are more likely to move between subsidiaries of the 
SB firm. Consequently, the previous positive effect decreases in effect size, and workers in a domestic 
SB firm are just as likely to move to another SB firm as they are to stay. Nevertheless, since they are 
still less likely to move to a non-SB firm, it confirms our previous findings that labor market remain 
separated.  
---- 
INSERT TABLE 7 AROUND HERE 
---- 
5.4 Labor mobility and wage growth 
Based on the theory section, the expectation is that we see more mobility between SB firms as well as 
higher mobility towards these firms from non-SB firms, because these new jobs offer attractive 
opportunities for career development and wage growth. However, alternative explanations are possible, 
for example  employees might decide to stay in SB firms, despite having to accept lower wages, because 
of a non-pecuniary benefits (i.e. preferences for national champions or task content of the job, such as 
specializing in R&D) or because their skills are undervalued in alternative employment opportunities. 
We therefore investigate whether labor flows to SB firms are indeed associated with wage growth.  
The results presented in Table 8 investigate the effect of job changes (move) on wage growth. The 
dependent variable “Wage growth” is measured as differences in the logarithm of wage. Model 7 in 
Table 8 shows the wage growth of the full sample. Model 8 measures wage growth in the CEM sample. 
Both models show that those employees moving to a SB firm or subsidiary experience higher wage 
growth. This wage growth premium is approximately 5 percent. 
---- 
INSERT TABLE 8 AROUND HERE 
---- 
6. Conclusions 
We analyzed job mobility and the associate wage premium for the universe of Danish firms. In 
particular, to investigate labor mobility as a possible channel for knowledge spillovers, we investigated 
the labor flows into and out of R&D intensive MNCs. To do so, we identified the top R&D investors 
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worldwide using the EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard dataset (known as 'Scoreboard' firms) 
active in Denmark - whether they are Danish Scoreboard firms, or subsidiaries of Danish or foreign 
scoreboard firms. This sample has been then matched with registry data, to disentangle job mobility 
between firms, as well as wage growth at the individual level following a job change. 
Our results show that employees of R&D intensive MNCs are less inclined to change job than other 
employees, and when they do move, they tend to move within the R&D intensive MNCs rather than to 
other firms in the economy. Working for an R&D intensive MNC may provide employees with 
perceived benefits deriving from their status as they tend to move less than other workers, but MNCs 
are also able to pay wage premia to attract possibly the most talented workers. Further analysis 
addressing specifically the effect of these two types of incentives for workers may provide evidence to 
support firms less financially endowed in attracting workers, and favour the flow of knowledge through 
labor mobility.  
Indeed, from our analysis on SB firms, there seems to form a kind of sub labor market within the national 
labor market, as employees exhibit higher mobility within this group of firms than between this group 
and the rest of the labor market. This is bad news for the concept of labor market mobility as a channel 
for knowledge transfer. Indeed, knowledge transfers from foreign MNCs to the overall domestic 
economy can be rather weak, thus limiting their impact on the knowledge creation of the hosting country. 
However, our results show that employees at foreign-owned MNCs, while not very likely to move to a 
domestic firm, they are much more likely to move to a domestic MNC. Hence, domestic MNCs seem 
to benefit from foreign MNCs labor mobility and may act as catalyser within the economy. In other 
words, domestic MNCs may provide ‘absorptive capacity’ and facilitate knowledge transfer by 
providing attractive employment opportunities for foreign MNC employees. This would imply that 
countries with strong domestic actors may be more able to grasp the potential benefits deriving from 
foreign direct investments and the presence of foreign multinational in their territory; how this interacts 
with the specific market labor conditions will deserve further research. We can expect that SMEs are 
particularly likely to be excluded from the benefits of spillovers through labor mobility from large 
foreign MNCs. In this respect, there might be a role for business associations and public institutions to 
make efforts to favor the entrance of SMEs into MNC supply chains – e.g. facilitating contacts and 
helping them (e.g. via standardization) to ensure that their production meets the high standards of MNCs 
– which could possibly enable them to enjoy higher levels of labor flows from foreign MNCs, in order 
to improve their knowledge stocks and technological competences.   
Our analysis is not without limitations. For example, we present evidence for Denmark, and there may 
be concerns about whether our results are relevant for other contexts (i.e. the well-known caveat of 
'external validity'). However, Denmark is a relatively small, open, and developed economy with a 
reasonably egalitarian wage structure, which limits the role of wages for job mobility. Hence, it is 
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possible that we underestimate the wage effects of job mobility compared to other countries. Another 
salient feature is that there is not a strong ranking of universities, such that there is no strong selection 
determining what university an individual attends, because educational qualifications are relatively 
comparable. Furthermore, because of limitations of the constituent datasets that are merged together, we 
focus on the period 2012-2014, and we cannot rule out that our results might be affected somewhat by 
the business cycle. For example, Haltiwanger et al. (2018b) show that movements from low-wage firms 
to high-wage firms are more common during booms than recessions. Further research on these topics 
would be welcome. 
Overall, therefore, the evidence suggests that there are limited labor flows from (both domestic and 
foreign) multinationals into domestic firms hampering knowledge transfer. This has implications for 
FDI policy, which has previously relied on arguments that multinationals bring with them knowledge 
transfer though labor mobility. Future research could explore how knowledge transfer due to job 
mobility from multinationals could be made more effective. It could also address the role of mobility 
for knowledge and technology transfer from other R&D intensive organizations, for example 
universities (Siegel and Wright 2007; Siegel and Wessner 2012). Finally, in a broader perspective, it is 
important to investigate complementarities with other mechanisms for developing innovation 
capabilities, through a policy mix that includes supply-side (e.g. grants, subsidies, tax incentives) and 
demand-side (public procurement for innovation) innovation policy instruments, as well as broader 
policy instruments such as higher education, trade, and high-skilled immigration.  
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Table 1: R&D and Innovation Activities 
 
Domestic SB firms and 
their subsidiaries 
Subsidiaries of foreign 
SB firms 
Other private firms in 
Denmark 
New product and/or service 61.29% 38.82% 24.49% 
New process 50.00% 30.20% 25.14% 
New market 54.84% 41.18% 31.09% 
New organisation 64.52% 45.88% 35.50% 
R&D expenditures    
   Mean 35.98 2.30 0.388 
   P25 0 0 0 
   Median 2.25 0 0 
   P75 28.97 0.54 0 
   Sum 2230.60 586.53 1736.76 
   per 1000 FTE 27.91 7.96 3.29 
   per Sales 9.33 5.82 0.13 
Av. Share of SB firm total 
international R&D expenditure 
65.74% 0.53% 
- 
Note: R&D expenditures in millions of euro in 2013. ‘per FTE’ is millions per 1000 FTE and ‘per Sales’ is euros of R&D 
expenditures per millions of euros in sales. 
 
Table 2:ISCO and Skill Level 
First digit 
of ISCO-08 
ISCO-08 label Group 
1 Managers High   
2 Professionals High   
3 
Technicians and Associate 
Professionals 
High   
4 Clerical Support Workers  Middling  
5 Services and Sales Workers   Low 
7 Craft and Related Trades Workers  Middling  
8 
Plant and Machine Operators and 
Assemblers 
 Middling  
9 Elementary Occupations   Low 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 full sample n=2.530.720 CEM sample n=1.937.075 
Move to non-SB firm 0.027 0.162 0.026 0.160 
Move to SB firm 0.003 0.057 0.003 0.059 
Move to Foreign SB firm 0.001 0.038 0.002 0.039 
Move to Domestic SB firm 0.002 0.042 0.002 0.044 
wage growth 0.030 0.126 0.030 0.123 
Scoreboard firm (any) 0.180 0.384 0.222 0.415 
Scoreboard firm (domestic) 0.092 0.289 0.112 0.316 
Scoreboard firm (foreign) 0.088 0.283 0.109 0.312 
Gender 1.309 0.462 1.285 0.451 
age 42.725 11.172 42.870 10.930 
education (yrs.) 13.919 2.322 13.938 2.209 
Experience (yrs.) 24.159 9.122 24.856 8.601 
Tenure (in previous firm) 7.435 6.493 7.742 6.616 
ln(hourly wage) 5.363 0.409 5.378 0.411 
Occupation. High 0.409 0.492 0.415 0.493 
Occupation. Middling 0.246 0.431 0.256 0.437 
employment size 1988.826 5410.731 2044.165 5400.731 
ln(employment size) 5.139 2.427 5.240 2.412 
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Table 4:Mobility Patterns of Workers 
  
non-
move  
move to non-SB 
firm 
move to foreign SB 
firm 
move to domestic SB 
firm Total 
non-SB employee 2.009.507 96.8 % 61.203 2.9 % 2.530 0.1 % 3.768 0.2 % 2.077.008 
  81.9 %  90.2 %  70.4 %  82.9 %  82.1 % 
SB employee 445.242 98.1 % 6.628 1.5 % 1.066 0.2 % 776 0.2 % 453.712 
  18.1 %  9.8 %  29.6 %  17.1 %  17.9 % 
 
Domestic SB 
employee 227.965 98.7 % 2.606 1.1 % 276 0.1 % 124 0.1 % 230.971 
  9.3 %  3.8 %  7.7 %  2.7 %  9.1 % 
 
Foreign SB 
employee 217.277 97.5 % 4.022 1.8 % 790 0.4 % 652 0.3 % 222.741 
  8.9 %  5.9 %  22.0 %  14.3 %  8.8 % 
Total  2.454.749  67.831  3.596  4.544  2.530.720 
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Table 5: Occupation and education 
Occupation 
Subsidiaries of 
domestic SB 
firms 
Subsidiaries of 
foreign SB firms 
Other private 
firms in 
Denmark 
Managers 5.61 7.43 5.4 
Professionals 36.92 20.9 18.71 
Technicians and Associate Professionals 21.6 19.3 12.48 
Clerical Support Workers 10.4 23.14 8.94 
Services and Sales Workers 1.58 6.72 18.94 
Skilled Agricultural, Forestry and Fishery 
Workers 
0.09 0.11 1.37 
Craft and Related Trades Workers 8.96 7.79 13.35 
Plant and Machine Operators and 
Assemblers 
11.04 10.34 7.45 
Elementary Occupations 3.8 4.28 13.35 
Education    
Primary education 11.61 17.98 25.4 
Upper secondary education (General) 4.01 6.84 7.11 
Upper secondary education (Specialised) 2.54 3.71 3.37 
Post-secondary non-tertiary education 34.04 37.93 38.39 
Short-cycle tertiary education 11.38 8.64 5.86 
Professional bachelor 12.01 10.48 8.02 
Academic bachelor 2.97 2.73 2.39 
Master or equivalent 18.93 10.99 8.7 
Doctoral or equivalent 2.52 0.69 0.75 
Source: DST’s registries
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Table 6: Multinomial Logit Estimates for Labor Mobility  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
VARIABLES  Non-SB firm  SB firm  Non-SB firm  SB firm  Non-SB firm  SB firm  Non-SB firm 
 foreign SB 
firm 
 Domestic SB 
firm 
CEM no no sample sample sample sample sample sample sample 
Industry, year, and region 
FE 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
SB firm (any) -0.3067*** 0.7176*** -0.2912*** 0.7470***      
 (0.053) (0.092) (0.053) (0.093)      
SB firm (domestic)     -0.3605*** 0.7421*** -0.3604*** 0.0106 0.9666*** 
     (0.084) (0.152) (0.084) (0.260) (0.168) 
SB firm (foreign)     -0.2497*** 0.7505*** -0.2497*** 0.8510*** 0.6328*** 
     (0.057) (0.090) (0.057) (0.123) (0.124) 
Gender -0.0770*** -0.0577 -0.0818*** -0.0248 -0.0820*** -0.0249 -0.0821*** -0.1315* 0.0590 
 (0.020) (0.040) (0.021) (0.038) (0.021) (0.039) (0.021) (0.066) (0.046) 
Age -0.0420*** -0.0540*** -0.0447*** -0.0593*** -0.0448*** -0.0593*** -0.0448*** -0.0512*** -0.0672*** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.007) (0.006) 
Education (yrs.) 0.0083** 0.0613*** 0.0057 0.0560*** 0.0059 0.0561*** 0.0059 0.0070 0.0941*** 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.011) (0.011) 
Experience (yrs.) 0.0238*** 0.0250*** 0.0266*** 0.0325*** 0.0267*** 0.0325*** 0.0267*** 0.0346*** 0.0320*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.008) (0.007) 
Tenure (previous firm) -0.0449*** -0.0748*** -0.0456*** -0.0726*** -0.0454*** -0.0726*** -0.0454*** -0.0821*** -0.0640*** 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) 
ln(hourly wage) 0.0722* 0.5149*** 0.0735* 0.4797*** 0.0722* 0.4796*** 0.0722* 0.5067*** 0.4706*** 
 (0.033) (0.048) (0.036) (0.049) (0.036) (0.049) (0.036) (0.076) (0.061) 
occuH 0.0535 0.4875*** 0.0760+ 0.5633*** 0.0756+ 0.5632*** 0.0756+ 0.6516*** 0.4892*** 
 (0.042) (0.066) (0.046) (0.064) (0.046) (0.063) (0.046) (0.080) (0.088) 
occuM -0.0220 0.2079*** -0.0369 0.1857** -0.0372 0.1857** -0.0371 0.2534** 0.1304 
 (0.040) (0.058) (0.044) (0.066) (0.044) (0.066) (0.044) (0.085) (0.099) 
ln(employment size ) -0.0501*** -0.0180 -0.0522*** -0.0226 -0.0515*** -0.0224 -0.0515*** -0.0659*** 0.0146 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.016) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.016) (0.023) 
Constant -2.1791*** -7.1467*** -2.1293*** -6.9576*** -2.1203*** -6.9572*** -2.1203*** -7.5114*** -7.8875*** 
 (0.200) (0.288) (0.221) (0.307) (0.222) (0.307) (0.222) (0.463) (0.403)      
1.905.153 
   
Observations 2.441.517 1.905.153 1.905.153 
Pseudo R2 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.103 
Log Likelihood -315339 -243470 -243463 -247227 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001. ** p<0.01. * p<0.05. + p<0.1 
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Table 7: Robustness analysis 
  Model 5 Model 6 
VARIABLES  Non-SB 
firm 
 SB firm  Non-SB 
firm 
 foreign SB 
firm 
 Domestic 
SB firm 
CEM sample sample sample sample sample 
Industry, year, and region 
FE 
yes yes yes yes yes 
Scoreboard firm (domestic) -0.3719*** -0.0294 -0.3719*** -0.0335 -0.0832 
 (0.083) (0.146) (0.083) (0.261) (0.135) 
Scoreboard firm (foreign) -0.2536*** 0.5644*** -0.2536*** 0.6117*** 0.5275*** 
 (0.057) (0.088) (0.057) (0.125) (0.107) 
Gender -0.0829*** -0.0678+ -0.0829*** -0.1432* -0.0025 
 (0.021) (0.041) (0.021) (0.066) (0.050) 
age -0.0448*** -0.0621*** -0.0448*** -0.0523*** -0.0734*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.008) (0.006) 
education (yrs.) 0.0059 0.0648*** 0.0059 0.0124 0.1094*** 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.012) (0.012) 
Experience (yrs.) 0.0268*** 0.0341*** 0.0268*** 0.0347*** 0.0355*** 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.008) (0.007) 
Tenure (in previous firm) -0.0455*** -0.0741*** -0.0455*** -0.0833*** -0.0645*** 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) 
ln(hourly wage) 0.0716* 0.5252*** 0.0717* 0.5429*** 0.5248*** 
 (0.037) (0.046) (0.037) (0.067) (0.058) 
occuH 0.0755+ 0.5167*** 0.0756+ 0.6312*** 0.4026*** 
 (0.046) (0.061) (0.046) (0.078) (0.083) 
occuM -0.0372 0.1162+ -0.0372 0.2076** 0.0317 
 (0.044) (0.060) (0.044) (0.078) (0.088) 
ln(employment size ) -0.0483*** 0.0062 -0.0483*** -0.0477** 0.0559*** 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.015) (0.017) 
Constant -2.1354*** -7.1639*** -2.1354*** -7.7736*** -8.1276*** 
 (0.223) (0.303) (0.223) (0.429) (0.411) 
Observations 1,903,387 1,903,387 
Pseudo R2 0.101 0.101 
Log Likelihood -239734 -243245 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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Table 8: Wage Growth for Mobility 
VARIABLES Model 7 Model 8 
CEM no sample 
Industry, year, and region FE yes yes 
Move to Scoreboard firms 0.0533*** 0.0541*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Scoreboard  0.0002 0.0012 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
Gender -0.0648*** -0.0671*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
age -0.0019*** -0.0026*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
education (yrs.) 0.0120*** 0.0118*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Experience (yrs.) 0.0033*** 0.0041*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
Tenure (in previous firm) -0.0002 -0.0001 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(hourly wage) -0.4454*** -0.4446*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) 
occuH 0.0842*** 0.0860*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
occuM 0.0201*** 0.0186*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
ln size -0.0036*** -0.0039*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 2.2669*** 2.2788*** 
 (0.054) (0.060) 
Observations 72.501 55.567 
R-squared 0.254 0.252 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001. ** p<0.01. * p<0.05. + p<0.1 
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Figure 1:Matching SB Firms and Register 
 
 
Figure 2: Median Wages across occupations and Typology of Firm 
 
Note: Median wages in Euro/hour, average for 2012-2014 
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Appendix: Mobility analysis on movers 
  Model A1 Model A2 Model A3 
VARIABLES  SB firm  SB firm  foreign SB firm  Domestic SB firm 
CEM sample sample sample sample 
industry and region FE yes yes yes yes 
          
Scoreboard firm (any) 0.9699***    
 (0.079)    
Scoreboard firm (domestic)  1.0598*** 0.4158* 1.2817*** 
  (0.115) (0.183) (0.148) 
Scoreboard firm (foreign)  0.9119*** 1.0084*** 0.8017*** 
  (0.091) (0.113) (0.125) 
Gender 0.0132 0.0122 -0.0829 0.0959+ 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.061) (0.051) 
age -0.0171** -0.0170** -0.0082 -0.0268*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) 
education (yrs.) 0.0642*** 0.0639*** 0.0133 0.1047*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) 
Experience (yrs.) 0.0091 0.0091 0.0088 0.0114 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) 
Tenure (in previous firm) -0.0143** -0.0147** -0.0212*** -0.0085 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
ln(hourly_wage) 0.3640*** 0.3680*** 0.4118*** 0.3492*** 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.074) (0.068) 
occuH 0.4118*** 0.4157*** 0.4716*** 0.3777*** 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.078) (0.079) 
occuM 0.1352* 0.1352* 0.2219** 0.0609 
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.086) (0.092) 
ln(employment_ size) 0.0796*** 0.0757*** 0.0263+ 0.1165*** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.022) 
Constant -4.6820*** -4.6768*** -5.4780*** -5.4496*** 
 (0.315) (0.316) (0.446) (0.413) 
     
Observations 55.537 55.537 55.567 55.567 
Pseudo-R2 0.143 0.143 0.145 0.145 
Log Likelihood -17194 -17190 -20966 -20966 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001. ** p<0.01. * p<0.05. + p<0.1 
 
 
 
